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NOTES
Come One, Come All: The New and
Developing World of Nonsignatory
Arbitration and Class Arbitration
MICHAEL P. DALY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic arbitration has developed in two new and interesting
ways.
First, nonsignatories 1 to an arbitration agreement may become
involved in the arbitral proceedings resulting from that agreement.
Although arbitration is a contractual matter based on party consent,2
there are exceptions to this rule derived from common-law notions of
implied consent and agency under which a person who never signed an
arbitration agreement may either compel signatories to the agreement to
arbitrate or be compelled to arbitrate.3 Arbitration agreements will
apply only to such nonsignatories "in rare circumstances." 4 The mere
existence of such circumstances, however, could potentially redefine the
role of arbitration in general.
Second, arbitral tribunals may be used to resolve multiple disputes
between different parties in one proceeding. Such a multiparty arbitra-
* The author is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Miami School of Law who will
graduate in May 2008. He holds a B.S. from Georgetown University. The author extends his
gratitude to his advisor, Alan C. Swan, Professor of Law at the University of Miami. Many thanks
also to Elena M. Marlow and Peter J. Carney.
1. "A signatory to an arbitration agreement is someone who has signed some form of an
arbitration agreement; a nonsignatory is someone who has not." Anthony M. DiLeo, The
Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements by and Against Nonsignatories, 2 J. AM. ARB. 31, 33
(2003). This term has been spelled in two ways: "nonsignatory" and "non-signatory." In the
remainder of this note, only the first spelling will be used because this is the spelling most recently
used by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2757, 2796 (2006);
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 203 (2000).
2. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ("[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Arbitration is contractual by nature ... .
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Arbitration
agreements apply to nonsignatories only in rare circumstances.").
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tion can take two forms. First, it can take the form of a "class arbitra-
tion,"'5 whereby a large group of claimants seeks to arbitrate a dispute
with one or more defendants.6 In the alternative, it can take the form of
a "consolidation," whereby various existing arbitral disputes involving
similar facts or parties are combined to be resolved in one proceeding.7
Given the increasingly global nature of business,8 it has become
normal to expect that many business disputes will involve corporations,
investors, creditors, affiliates, franchises, or any other interested parties
who (1) are from different countries, and (2) have included a clause in
their business agreements providing that any potential contractual dis-
putes will be resolved through international arbitration.9 Thus, interna-
tional arbitral tribunals are increasingly faced with the task of resolving
a great variety of commercial disputes, often involving multiple con-
tracts, multiple parties, and related or interested nonsignatory parties to
the dispute.
This note considers the extent to which the traditional model of an
international arbitral dispute, rooted in a consensual arbitration agree-
ment between two parties, has been expanded and possibly distorted to
include nonsignatories or to combine separate disputes. Part II examines
the role and influence of the United States in international arbitration.
Part HI considers the development of nonsignatory involvement in
5. Such a proceeding has been referred to in many different ways, including "class
arbitration," "class action arbitration," "class-wide arbitration," "classwide arbitration," and
"arbitral class action." In the remainder of this note, only "class arbitration" will be used because
this is the way that the U.S. Supreme Court has most recently referred to such proceedings. See
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 passim (2003).
6. See Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the Class Action? No:
Permitting Companies To Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Would Be
Dangerous and Unwise, DisP. REsOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13, 18 [hereinafter Sternlight,
Dangerous and Unwise] (discussing how class arbitrations resemble judicial class actions).
7. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 86 (2000) [hereinafter Stemlight,
Arbitration Meets the Class Action] (noting that consolidation can arise only "after two or more
arbitrations have been filed").
8. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT (2005); see also T.R. REID,
THE UNrrED STATES OF EUROPE I I1-18 (2004) (arguing that U.S. consumers are dependant on
products that were produced by European companies).
9. See generally Phillip Capper, Litigation, Arbitration and Dispute Resolution: A Birthday
Tribute, LEGAL WK., Oct. 5, 2006 (noting that international arbitration greatly increased in
popularity as a business dispute-resolution method since the Arbitration Act was enacted in the
UK); Lubna Kably, Indian Arbitration Is in Sync with International Practice, EcON. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2000 ("Nowadays it is common practice to insert a suitable arbitration clause in international
commercial joint venture agreements."); Joe Leahy & Sheila McNulty, Where Judgments Rarely
Stick: The Failure To Respect Arbitration in Asia Faces Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at 33
(noting that foreigners usually insist on including arbitration provisions in contracts with parties
from developing nations); see also Mary Flood, Texas Lawyers Make a Splash Outside of U.S.,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2000, at Al (noting that U.S. lawyers with expertise in international
arbitration have profited from the increase in international business disputes).
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domestic and international arbitration. Part IV explains the recent
growth of multiparty arbitrations in the United States and in Europe.
Part V discusses the ways in which these concepts could overlap in the
context of international arbitration, whereby nonsignatory class mem-
bers to a dispute may be compelled to participate or be subject to class
arbitration. The implications and ramifications of such a scenario reflect
real questions and concerns facing the international arbitration commu-
nity today about the evolving nature of arbitration and the actual differ-
ences between arbitration and judicial litigation. This note concludes
that, although these two developments could potentially distort the tradi-
tional model of international arbitration, they also offer potential bene-
fits to the same model.
II. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The United States has been involved in international arbitration
since 1794.1° In modem times, however, the United States is regarded
by some as a "latecomer" to the arena of international arbitration 1
because it did not become a member of the New York Convention 2
until 1970. Nevertheless, as the overall caseload of international arbitra-
tion proceedings has increased substantially in the 1990s and into the
current decade,13 U.S. involvement in international arbitration has also
increased.14 The American Arbitration Association ("AAA") announced
in 2002 that it had become the largest international commercial arbitral
institution in the world,15 and U.S. parties have appeared in arbitrations
before the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") more than any
other nationality for every year since 1998.16
The increased role of the United States in international arbitration
10. Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 242 (2006).
11. Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration Is Not Your Father's Oldsmobile, 2005 J.
Disp. RESOL. 323, 347 (2005).
12. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention]; see also Drahozal, supra note 10, at 243.
13. See Drahozal, supra note 10, at 233.
14. Id.
15. ICDR Becomes World's Largest International Commercial Arbitral Institution, MARKET
WIRE, May 16, 2002, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-pwwi/is 200205/aimarkO2O42
262; see also Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party-Who Is a Proper Party
in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association and Other
International Institutions, 34 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 711, 711 (2003) ("The number of
international arbitrations occurring under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) has increased dramatically [between 2001 and 2003].").
16. See Drahozal, supra note 10, at 244; see also Michael Goldhaber, The Court That Came
in from the Cold, AM. LAW., May 2001, at 98, 101-02 (explaining how U.S. lawyers are
beginning to take greater part in international arbitration).
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has triggered certain tensions between U.S. lawyers and foreign arbitra-
tion practitioners. Some commentators believe that U.S. lawyers have
attempted to "legalize". the field of international arbitration.' 7 One
example is the importation of jargon from domestic litigation into arbi-
tration. 8  In addition, U.S. and European courts differ in their
approaches to important questions of procedural and substantive law that
affect arbitration. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically
stated that a court should decide independently the question of arbi-
trability-whether parties must arbitrate as opposed to litigate-when
the parties did not agree to have the arbitrator make such a decision; but
a court should defer to an arbitrator's decision regarding arbitrability if
the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrator decide
this matter. 9 This contravenes the practice of many European courts,
which simply allow arbitrators to decide such issues.2 ° The United
States has also created unique arbitration practices for consumer and
employment disputes, which differ from those practices in the rest of the
world.2"
The unique nature of U.S. litigation and arbitration practices is
reflected in the development of nonsignatory arbitration and multiparty
arbitration abroad.
III. NONSIGNATORY INVOLVEMENT IN ARBITRATION
A. Nonsignatory Involvement in Domestic Arbitration
Arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract, whereby contrac-
tual parties may only be required to submit a dispute to arbitration pur-
suant to their formal agreement.22 However, there are several important
exceptions to this rule that have developed under common-law notions
of "implied consent. '23 These doctrines may serve either to benefit or to
17. Dunham, supra note 11, at 346.
18. Id. at 332.
19. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also James M.
Hosking, Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: The Quest for
Consent, 20 ARB. INT'L 289, 301 (2004).
20. See Dunham, supra note 11, at 345.
21. See Drahozal, supra note 10, at 233, 253.
22. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 127 (1994) ("[E]nforcement [of an arbitration
agreement] turns exclusively on the fact that the contracting parties consented to any arbitration at
all.").
23. See Lamm & Aqua, supra note 16, at 720 ("[I]f the actions or relationships of a non-
signatory link it to one of the signed parties to an arbitration, [an arbitral] tribunal can find
'implied consent,' or a 'backdoor' obligation to arbitrate."). The concept of "implied consent" is
also referred to as an "inherent link" of claims that are "inseparably wound." See Charles Lee
Eisen, What Arbitration Agreement? Compelling Non-Signatories To Arbitrate, Disp. RESOL. J.,
May-July 2001, at 40, 45.
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harm a nonsignatory to an arbitral agreement because either (1) the non-
signatory may compel a signatory to the agreement to arbitrate a dispute
or (2) the nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute despite
never having signed an arbitration agreement.24 The U.S. Supreme
Court has a long-standing domestic policy of favoring arbitration,25 and
these doctrines reflect that policy.
1. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
An arbitration clause may apply to a party who is a nonsignatory to
one agreement containing an arbitration clause but who is a signatory to
a second agreement that incorporates the terms of the first agreement.26
This doctrine is often used under the heading of "succession," whereby a
merged entity continues to prosecute arbitral proceedings started by one
of its original entities.27
2. ASSUMPTION
An arbitration clause may apply to a nonsignatory who has
impliedly agreed to arbitrate.28 Under this theory, the nonsignatory's
conduct is a determinative factor.29 For example, a nonsignatory who
voluntarily begins arbitrating the merits of a dispute before an arbitral
tribunal may be bound by the arbitrator's ruling on that dispute even
though the nonsignatory was not initially required to arbitrate the dis-
pute.3° The principle underlying this doctrine is that a nonsignatory
should not be able to manifest an intent to arbitrate on which an oppos-
ing party is caused to rely, only later to assert that the resulting arbitral
award is invalid.31
24. See Carroll E. Neesemann et. al., The Law of Securities Arbitration, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS 821, 855 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. BO-01A6, 2002) ("[N]on-signatories may compel arbitration of
claims asserted against them and conversely, some non-signatories may be compelled to arbitrate
their claims.").
25. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)
(discussing that doubts about the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting
that there is a "federal policy favoring arbitration"); see also Eisen, supra note 23, at 42.
26. See, e.g., Imp. Exp. Steel Corp. v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 351 F.2d 503, 506 (2d
Cir. 1965) (holding that a nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration clause against the signatory of
a contract that is incorporated by reference into a second contract to which the nonsignatory is a
party).
27. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IT 3-37-38, at 180-81 (4th ed. 2004).
28. See Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991).
29. See id. ("[A]n agreement [to arbitrate] may be implied from the party's conduct.").
30. See id. (holding that employee nonsignatory "manifested a clear intent to arbitrate" by
sending union representative to negotiate in arbitral proceeding).
31. See In re Transrol Navegaqdo S.A., 782 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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3. AGENCY
A nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may be bound to arbi-
trate a dispute stemming from that agreement under the traditional laws
of agency.32 A principal may also be bound to arbitrate a claim based on
an agreement containing an arbitration clause signed by the agent.3 3 The
agent, however, does not generally become individually bound by exe-
cuting such an agreement on behalf of a disclosed principal unless there
is clear evidence that the agent intended to be bound.34 If the agent
executes such a contract but fails to reveal a relationship with the princi-
pal, the agent may be compelled to arbitrate either individually3 5 or
alongside the principal. 36  Courts have specifically compelled non-
signatory agents to arbitrate where the agent played an important role in
the alleged wrongful conduct37 or where the agent derived a benefit from
the contract.38
Likewise, an agent is "entitled, pursuant to an arbitration agreement
between his principal and the plaintiff, to compel arbitration of the plain-
tiff's claims against the agent for acts taken in his or her representative
capacity."39 Further, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
upheld such a ruling on the ground that holding otherwise would allow a
plaintiff who had signed an arbitration agreement to avoid "the practical
consequences of [the] agreement ... by naming nonsignatory parties as
[defendants] in his complaint."40
4. VEIL PIERCING / ALTER EGO
In the corporate context, a nonsignatory corporation to an arbitra-
tion agreement may be bound by that agreement if the agreement is
32. Eisen, supra note 23, at 44.
33. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-30, at 176 ("[A] principle may find itself
bound by an arbitration agreement signed by its agent.").
34. See Lerner v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 938 F.2d 2, 5 (2d Cir.
1991) ("An individual who is only an indirect beneficiary of the agreement thus should not be
directly bound to the terms of the agreement absent clear evidence of an intent to create individual
liability."); see also Lamm & Aqua, supra note 15, at 720.
35. See Beck v. Suro Textiles, Ltd., 612 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
36. See Baum v. Avado Brands, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:99-CV-0700G, 1999 WL 1034757, at *8
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999). In Baum, the court held that both a principle and an agent may be
bound to arbitrate a claim that arises from an arbitration agreement to which the principle was a
signatory, where claims against the principle and the agent are identical, and where the agent acted
in an agency capacity in relation to agreement. Id.
37. See id.
38. See Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir.
1999).
39. Baum, 1999 WL 1034757, at *7.
40. Arnold v. Arnold Corp.-Printed Commc'ns for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir.
1990) (quoting Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 668 F. Supp. 625, 629 (N.D. Ohio 1987)).
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signed by its parent, subsidiary, or affiliate.41 Although no uniform fed-
eral law for piercing the corporate veil exists,42 courts will generally do
so when a nonsignatory corporation controls another corporation and
uses it as a signatory for an improper purpose, such as to perpetrate a
fraud or to bring about substantial injustice or inequity. 3 Under this
theory, the totality of circumstances must be examined in a highly fact-
sensitive manner.44
5. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL / THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is usually applied by non-
signatory defendants who wish to compel signatory plaintiffs to arbitrate
a dispute.45 This will generally be permitted when (1) the signatory
must rely on the terms of the contract in support of its claims against the
nonsignatory, a6 or (2) the signatory alleges that it and the nonsignatory
engaged in interdependent misconduct that is intertwined with the obli-
gations imposed by the contract.47
A nonsignatory may also be bound to arbitrate by knowingly
exploiting an agreement that contains an arbitration clause.48 Thus, a
nonsignatory may be estopped from accepting the benefits of a contract
while at the same time asserting that its lack of signature precludes
enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause. 49  The doctrine is in
place to stop nonsignatories from "disregard[ing] equity and con-
traven[ing] the purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act.""°
This doctrine is also referred to as "third party beneficiary" doctrine
41. See Dwayne E. Williams, Binding Nonsignatories to Arbitration Agreements, 25
FRANCHISE L.J. 175, 179 (2006). Likewise, a corporate nonsignatory may bind a signatory to an
arbitration agreement if the agreement was signed by one of the nonsignatory corporation's
subsidiaries. See JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
42. See Williams, supra note 41, at 179.
43. See Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 2003); InterGen
N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 148-49 (1st Cir. 2003); Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So.
2d 1114, 1119-20 (Fla. 1984).
44. See Williams, supra note 41, at 179.
45. See id. at 178.
46. See MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (lth Cir. 1999).
47. See JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2004); In re
Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 975 (11th Cir. 2002); MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at
947.
48. See E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates,
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc.,
64 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1995)).
49. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418
(4th Cir. 2000); Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d
Cir. 1993). Courts have held that, to bind the nonsignatory to arbitration, the nonsignatory must
receive a "direct benefit" under the arbitration agreement and not merely an "incidental benefit."
See Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999).
50. Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J. of Cal., 426 F. Supp. 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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because it exists to bind third parties to arbitration agreements when
they intentionally and directly benefit from the agreement without
objecting to it.5 Nonsignatories are often bound under the doctrine of
third-party beneficiary if they are members of a class of people who will
benefit from a contract between other parties.2
6. ASSIGNMENT / SUCCESSION
Under standard contract doctrine, an assignee or successor in inter-
est to a contract has certain rights and duties.53  For example, the
assignee or successor in interest of an insurance contract may have the
right to begin arbitral proceedings against the insurer of the original
insured party.5 4 On the other hand, an assignee or successor in interest
of any contract containing an arbitration provision may have the duty to
arbitrate any disputes arising from that agreement despite never having
signed the agreement.55 This doctrine is also grounded in the belief that
a nonsignatory assignee or successor in interest should be prohibited
from receiving a contractual benefit left behind by a predecessor signa-
tory without also having to honor the arbitration provision of the
contract.56
B. Nonsignatory Involvement in International Arbitration
Nonsignatory involvement in international arbitration has been
described as a "delicate" and critical aspect of international arbitration.57
The New York Convention, which has been regarded as "the most
important international treaty relating to international commercial arbi-
tration,' 58 reflects this concern over nonsignatory involvement in arbi-
51. See Hoffman v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 143 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004-05 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
52. See, e.g., Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 22-23 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that insurance company is entitled to compel arbitration as third-party beneficiary
to New York Stock Exchange rules that provide that disputes between members and non-members
shall be arbitrated).
53. James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability To Compel International
Commercial Arbitration: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J.
469, 493-94 (2004). Assignment and succession in law are "closely analogous" but not identical
doctrines. Id. at 491. Assignment refers to "[t]he transfer of rights or property." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 115 (7th ed. 1999). Succession refers to "[t]he acquisition of rights or property by
inheritance." Id. at 1145.
54. See REDERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, T 3-30, at 176.
55. See DiLeo, supra note 1, at 63 ("When a contract states that it binds successors and
assigns, or, when by operation of law, successors in interest are bound by the terms of a contract,
arbitration clauses may also bind such nonsignatory successors in interest."); see also Bel-Ray Co.
v. Chemrite Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999).
56. See Lamm & Aqua, supra note 15, at 726-27.
57. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REv.-FoREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
232, 257 (1995).
58. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, T 1-146, at 81.
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tration by requiring that an arbitration agreement be "in writing" and
"signed by parties" or be contained in an exchange of letters or tele-
grams to be held enforceable. 9 U.S. jurisprudence is inconsistent as to
whether a court should apply a strict or lenient interpretation of this
requirement in the context of nonsignatories.6° Many commentators
agree that this requirement is indicative of the fact that the New York
Convention was originally written in 1958 and is "beginning to show its
age.' Many international arbitral tribunals also currently ignore the
requirement as long as there is some written evidence of an agreement to
arbitrate, including an oral agreement to arbitrate recorded by any party
or by a third party.62
International contractual agreements increasingly tend to contain
interwoven and multilayered legal obligations. Consequently, the ques-
tion of how to deal with nonsignatories who become entangled in dis-
putes over such agreements is no longer theoretical. Rather, it has
become a regular issue before international arbitral tribunals. 63 Arbitral
tribunals frequently encounter this issue in disputes involving construc-
tion companies, maritime parties, state entities, and investment treaty
disputes.6' Tribunals also deal with third parties in evidentiary issues,
whereby third parties may sometimes be compelled to produce evidence
or documents in arbitral proceedings with the assistance of a court of
competent jurisdiction.65
Nonsignatories to arbitration agreements may also be bound to
arbitrate before an international arbitral tribunal under various legal the-
ories that reflect domestic legal theories concerning nonsignatories.66
Under the "group of companies doctrine," the benefits and duties
arising from an arbitration agreement may be extended to other members
of the same group of companies or to the shareholders, officers, or direc-
tors of a signatory company.67 For example, in Dow Chemical France v.
59. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); see also Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d
666, 669 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker & Zanger (W. Coast) Ltd. v. Stone Design S.A., 4 F. Supp. 2d
931, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Fabrizio Marrella, Unity
and Diversity in International Arbitration: The Case of Maritime Arbitration, 20 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1055, 1095-98 (2005) (explaining that maritime arbitration agreements and e-commerce
arbitration agreements may not be required to be in writing under the New York Convention).
60. See Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 300.
61. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 1-146, at 81.
62. See id., 3-09, at 161.
63. See Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 289.
64. Hosking, Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, supra note 53, at 479.
65. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 6-79, at 360.
66. See discussion supra Part III.A.
67. See REDERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-31, at 176-78; see also Hosking, Quest for
Consent, supra note 19, at 294.
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ISOVER Saint Gobain,68 the ICC arbitral tribunal determined that non-
signatory parent companies and affiliates to an arbitration agreement can
be treated by the parties to the agreement as "one and the same eco-
nomic reality" with the signatories. 69 Such parent and affiliate compa-
nies could probably be included as claimants alongside the signatories to
a dispute because of their unique and special relationship with the signa-
tory claimants.
Statistically, non-party involvement in international arbitration is
increasing and has been compared to the issue of privity in product-
liability cases in the United States in the 1960s.70 Nonsignatories may
become involved in international arbitration through the private law of
assignment, agency, and succession.7" U.S. courts have applied the doc-
trine of agency to bind agents to arbitrate claims in international dis-
putes.7" An agent may be bound to an agreement, which works to his or
her benefit.73 Similarly, courts have applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to international disputes by compelling arbitration between
companies that had not signed an arbitration agreement if the claims
were "inherently inseparable." 4 Some European countries have even
enacted statutes, requiring nonsignatories to arbitrate certain kinds of
disputes in domestic arbitrations within those countries.75
68. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Oct. 21, 1983, J.D.I. 1983, 110, 899.
69. Id. at 904. The court used the phrase "une rgalitj jconomique unique." Id.
70. See Paulsson, supra note 57, at 255-57 (describing the ability of a complainant to directly
face a defendant before an international arbitral tribunal despite contractual formalities as
analogous to the ability of a consumer to bring a direct product liability action against an upstream
manufacturer).
71. See REDFERN & HUNTR, supra note 27, 3-34, at 179.
72. See, e.g., Alamria v. Telcor Int'l, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 658, 669-74 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
nonsignatory Saudi Arabian agent of U.S. manufacturer bound by an ICC arbitration clause under
principles of apparent authority).
73. See Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that Italian agent who signed arbitration agreement with boat classification society
on behalf of French principal could be bound to arbitrate claim against society because agent
derived benefit from the contract).
74. See, e.g., JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2004)
(permitting nonsignatory subsidiaries of companies from the Netherlands, Norway, and
Luxembourg to compel signatory customers to arbitrate claims that were "undeniably
intertwined"); J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th
Cir. 1988) (referring company's claims against another company and its foreign affiliates to
arbitration where the claimant company only had distribution contracts containing arbitration
clauses with some of the affiliates); see also Eisen, supra note 23, at 45.
75. See Otto Sandrock, "Intra" and "Extra-Entity" Agreements To Arbitrate and Their
Extension to Non-Signatories Under German Law, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 423, 433 (2002) (explaining
that under the German Arbitration Act enacted in 1998 a "new entrant [to an arbitration
agreement] will be bound by the arbitration agreement although he never attached his signature to
it").
[Vol. 62:95
2007] NONSIGNATORY ARBITRATION AND CLASS ARBITRATION 105
IV. CLASS ARBITRATION
A. Class-Action Litigation in the United States
The class action is a "uniquely American procedural device" that
allows a small number of individual plaintiffs to represent a larger group
of plaintiffs in one litigation proceeding against a single defendant who
caused a similar injury to all of the plaintiffs.76 Federal class-action
suits are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"),
which was adopted in 1966 and coincided with the American civil-rights
revolution.77
To start a class-action suit, a self-appointed class representative or a
group of representatives may file suit on behalf of the entire class.78 An
"entrepreneurial" lawyer often recruits, represents, and finances the liti-
gation, hoping that it will result in a large settlement or a high jury ver-
dict that includes attorney fees.79 Because prior consent is not required
from absent class members, elaborate and strict procedural steps must be
taken under Rule 23 to protect the rights of the absent class members. 80
The representative plaintiff or plaintiffs must provide notice that each
member of the class action is aware of the action, knows of the class, has
the opportunity to opt out of the class, and has the chance to enter an
appearance or a meaningful opportunity to participate should he or she
wish to do so. 1 Generally, notice must entail more than "mere
publication."82
The court presiding over a class action plays a critical role in ensur-
ing that the appropriate procedural steps are taken. 83 Most importantly,
the judge must "certify" the class very early in the proceeding.84 To
76. Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and
Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401 (2002).
77. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also Sherman, supra note 76, at 409. Many class actions
during the civil-rights revolution involved plaintiffs requesting injunctive relief as opposed to
damages. See id. at 404-05. Both are allowed under the U.S. system of class actions. Id. Please
note that class actions may also be governed by state law. See Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not
Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class Action Litigation over Tobacco Industries, 33 GA. L.
REV. 979, 998 (1999) ("Many states have class action statutes or rules similar to Federal Rule
23."). For purposes of efficiency, this note focuses primarily on federal class actions.
78. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
79. Sherman, supra note 76, at 409.
80. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral
Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1727-31 (2006). As part of this process, the court
may select appropriate counsel where several people are competing for the same position. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.271, at 279 (2004).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see also Weston, supra note 80, at 1730, 1768-72.
82. Weston, supra note 80, at 1730.
83. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) ("[A court] must
provide minimal procedural due process protection [to bind absent class members].").
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
certify, the judge affirms that (1) the class is so large that joinder would
be impracticable ("numerosity requirement"), (2) there are questions of
law and of fact common to the class ("commonality requirement"), (3)
the representative plaintiffs' claims and defenses are typical of those of
the entire class ("typicality requirement"), and (4) the representative
plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the entire
class ("representativeness requirement")." Because the decision is often
outcome determinative, class certification has been referred to as a
"death knell."'86 The court also has the responsibility of determining the
adequacy of representation and the fairness of settlements.87
Class actions serve important policy purposes. First, they are effi-
cient and economically beneficial because they render it unnecessary to
retry the same issue on behalf of each class member.88 Second, class
actions encourage finality of claims by avoiding inconsistent outcomes
in separate trials of the same issues.89 Third, they are a cost-effective
way for plaintiffs with individual claims that are small but with an
aggregate claim that is large to obtain proper representation from an
attorney who is willing to treat the claim seriously.90 Last, class actions
serve the public interest as a "mechanism for the enforcement of public
rights."9 1
B. Class Arbitration in the United States
Two recent developments in the United States have made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to pursue class actions. First, Congress enacted
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, granting federal courts exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction over all class-action claims where the value
in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and where minimal diversity exists.92
85. Id. at 23(a).
86. Weston, supra note 80, at 1728.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), (g). These procedures are not required in regular litigation.
88. See Sherman, supra note 76, at 401.
89. See id.
90. See Joseph E. Tilson & Bradford A. LeHew, FLSA Cases: The New Wave of Employment
Litigation, in 31ST ANNUAL INSTITrE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, 395, 401 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H0-00K5, 2002) ("Although ... each individual's claim
. . . is generally small, when plaintiffs join together in nationwide class actions, the resulting
damages (and attorney's fees) can be immense."); Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts,
Conflict and Compensation in Japan, France, and the United States, 34 LAW & Soc'Y Rav. 651,
657 (2000) ("[C]lass actions allow large groups of individuals to join in a common legal action.").
91. Greg Kilby, Note, Leaving a Stone Unturned-The Unanswered Question from Green
Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Does the Federal Arbitration Act Permit Classwide Arbitration?,
59 U. MiAMi L. REV. 413, 418 (2005).
92. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(d)(2)(a)-(c) (2005); see also Justin D. Forlenza, Note, CAFA and
Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1065, 1075-77 (2006) (discussing
congressional expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction over class actions).
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This change in the law is regarded as detrimental to class-action plain-
tiffs because federal courts have traditionally been less sympathetic to
class-action plaintiffs than state courts have been.93 Second, over the
last ten years, large corporations have attempted to minimize their
potential to become class-action defendants by placing mandatory bind-
ing arbitration clauses in many of their consumer contracts.94 These
contracts of adhesion have generally been enforced.95
As a result of these two developments, some classwide claims have
been brought before arbitral tribunals rather than before courts.96 This
type of proceeding may occur if the parties consent to class arbitration, 97
if the arbitrator rules that the arbitration agreement permits such a pro-
ceeding, 98 or if a judge enforces the arbitrator's determination. 99
In practice, class arbitrations have existed as a procedural device in
the United States since the 1980s;1o ° however, they have not been uni-
versally or clearly accepted into U.S. jurisprudence. Entire industries
have rejected class arbitrations as a means of dispute resolution.10 ' Pro-
cedural details of class arbitrations are largely undefined by the Federal
93. See Sherman, supra note 76, at 409 ("[F]ederal courts . . . are perceived to be less
sympathetic to class actions than state courts.").
94. See Allison Torres Burtka, Courts Weigh in on Class Action Bans in Arbitration, TRIAL,
Sept. 2006, at 16 ("Mandatory arbitration clauses are common in all types of consumer
agreements .... "); Kilby, supra note 91, at 413 ("Corporate America is increasingly relying on
adhesive contracts to procure mandatory binding arbitration."); Stemlight, Arbitration Meets the
Class Action, supra note 7, at 5-6 (examining how potential class action defendants hope to
surreptitiously defeat the class action through the use of mandatory binding arbitration).
95. See, e.g., Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
court may not compel arbitration of class action unless parties expressly provide for class
arbitration); see also Bernard Hanotiau, A New Development in Complex Multiparty-Multicontract
Proceedings: Classwide Arbitration, 20 ARB. Ir'L. 39, 46 (2004) ("In the United States, most
courts enforce arbitration agreements that are imposed in contracts of adhesion .... ").
96. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 449 (2003). The Green Tree plaintiffs
sought arbitration of a classwide dispute after the state court of appeals reversed the trial court's
ruling denying the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. Id.
97. Under standard contract principles, the parties can agree to resolve their dispute according
to their wishes. Nevertheless, the idea that all parties to a class arbitration could clearly agree to
arbitrate their dispute outside of a contractual arrangement is perhaps unrealistic, because class
actions often involve an enormous and amorphous class of claimants. Thus, it is more realistic to
expect class arbitration to occur pursuant to the original agreement or pursuant to a judge's or
arbitrator's ruling.
98. See Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 451 ("Under the terms of the parties' contracts, the
question-whether the agreement forbids class arbitration-is for the arbitrator to decide.").
99. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("[An agreement . . . to submit to arbitration . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable .... " ).
100. See Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Ct. App. 980) ("[T]here is no
insurmountable obstacle to conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis."), vacated, 645 P.2d
1192 (Cal. 1982), and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984).
101. See Kilby, supra note 91, at 422-23 ("[Tlhe entire securities industry has rejected
classwide arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.").
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Arbitration Act ("FAA")1 2  and the Uniform Arbitration Act
("UAA").103 Thus, such procedures are "largely left to the ad hoc deter-
mination of the arbitrator or provider." 1" In 2003, the American Arbi-
tration Association created a list of Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations. 10 5 Under the prevailing view, there may be no class arbi-
tration or consolidation of separate arbitral claims without the express
consent of the parties. 11 6 However, some courts have found that class
arbitration or consolidation may be a fair and just way to resolve a dis-
pute if the agreement is silent on the issue. a 7
The opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue has been
ambiguous. Although the Court has avoided addressing whether the
FAA permits class arbitration,10 8 it has suggested in dicta that such a
proceeding may be permissible.0 9 Given the due process concerns that
the Court has consistently shown in the past regarding class-action liti-
gation, 110 it is likely that these concerns would only be magnified in the
102. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (stating no procedures to be followed in class arbitration).
103. UNIF. ARBrrATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 10-87 (1997) (stating no procedures to be
followed in class arbitration).
104. Weston, supra note 80, at 1732; see also Sternlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
supra note 7, at 16 ("[N]o state arbitration statute contains specific provisions dealing with the
treatment of class actions.").
105. See AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936.
106. See, e.g., Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione S.P.A. v. MAV Allegra, 198 F.3d 473,
482 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the FAA provides that "non-class-action arbitration" is the proper
procedure where parties did not expressly provide for class arbitration in their agreement); Champ
v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he FAA forbids federal judges
from ordering class arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.");
Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that "absent a provision
in an arbitration agreement authorizing consolidation, a district court is without power to
consolidate arbitration proceedings").
107. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 210 F.3d 771, 775
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an arbitration agreement that is silent regarding consolidation of
proceedings can reasonably be interpreted to mean that the parties impliedly consented to
consolidated claims); Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 492 (Ct. App. 980) ("[T]here
is no insurmountable obstacle to conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis."), vacated, 645
P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (discussing how class arbitration is a better option than class action litigation or multiple
individual arbitrations).
108. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453-54 (2003) (holding that the
permissibility of class arbitration is for an arbitrator to decide under state contract law); see also
Kilby, supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that the Supreme Court "failed to seize the opportunity" to
address whether the FAA permits class arbitration).
109. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (suggesting that class
arbitration is possible under New York Stock Exchange rules because the rules "provide for
collective proceedings"); see also Kilby, supra note 91, at 425-26 (discussing the Court's
suggestion in Gilmer).
110. See also Kilby, supra note 91, at 423 ("A major theme running through contemporary
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context of arbitration. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently stated
that it views arbitration as a preferred dispute-resolution method.'II The
domestic debate over class arbitrations is likely to continue in the future.
C. Class Litigation Abroad
The U.S. class-action procedural device is viewed with "admiration
and suspicion" abroad. 1 2 For example, European countries have had
very little experience with group litigation with the exception of com-
mon-law countries, such as the United Kingdom and Wales." 3
Despite this tradition, there has been a recent trend toward mul-
tiparty litigation in Europe." 4 One reason for this trend is the decline of
welfare and legal-aid programs abroad. 115 Another reason for this trend
is the need for greater protection to investors. 1 6 As a result, countries
that have traditionally ignored group litigation as a dispute-resolution
mechanism are now eager to experiment with different variations of this
U.S. procedure." 7
Legislation governing and outlining rules for group actions has
been enacted in the past twelve years in many countries, including the
Netherlands, Portugal, England, Wales, Sweden, and Spain." 8 This
trend was reflected in the European Directive on Injunctions for the Pro-
Supreme Court class action jurisprudence is the fact that the class action, as a dispute resolution
device, raises several due process concerns.").
111. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (noting
that there is a "national policy favoring arbitration"); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that there is a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements").
112. Sherman, supra note 76, at 401.
113. See Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 1 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 321, 328 (2001) ("[T]he only European jurisdictions that have any significant
experience with multi-party actions for compensatory damages are the common law countries:
England and Wales .... ").
114. See Stefano M. Grace, Strengthening Investor Confidence in Europe: U.S.-Style Securities
Class Actions and the Acquis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 281, 284 (2006)
(noting that there is a "recent trend to adopt variations of U.S.-style class action mechanisms in
Europe"); If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2007 ("[C]lass-action
lawsuits are on their way [to Europe]."); Paul Llewellyn & Colleen Davies, American Glean,
LAWYER.COM, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.thelawyer.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id= 119356&d=1 22&h=
24&f=46 (explaining that there is an increase in the occurrence of quasi-class actions in Europe
because EU citizens are allured by the U.S. system).
115. See Sherman, supra note 76, at 402.
116. See Grace, supra note 114, at 284 (noting that Europeans have adopted U.S. class action
procedures "in an effort to provide greater investor protections").
117. See Sherman, supra note 76, at 432 ("The pace of experimentation by other countries with
group, representative, or class litigation devices has increased enormously in recent years.").
118. See id. at 420 ("In May 2002, the Swedish Parliament passed the Act on Group Actions
. ... ); Hodges, supra note 113, at 327 (outlining statutes allowing group actions in the
Netherlands, Portugal, England, Wales, and Spain).
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tection of Consumers' Interests in 2000, allowing certain organizations
and entities to file group litigation in European courts. 1 9 In fact, this is
not such a radical change for many European jurisdictions including
Germany, France, and Italy, which, for many years, have allowed non-
parties to join ongoing criminal investigations or prosecution proceed-
ings as a partie civile in order to receive compensation in the event of a
favorable ruling. 120 French government officials have held an ongoing
debate about enacting legislation to introduce class-action lawsuits in
France, 2 and U.S. firms that specialize in class-action work are "posi-
tioning themselves in anticipation of a potential fusillade of class actions
across the Atlantic."''
22
European group actions differ from U.S. class actions in a number
of important ways.
First, individuals may not appoint themselves as class representa-
tives in the European system.1 23 This is a function of the fact that the
European public is generally protected from injury by public institutions
such as Social Security. Thus, the European system does not need
entrepreneurial trial attorneys motivated by contingency-fee agreements
to act as private Attorney Generals through the tort litigation system like
in the United States.' 24  Naturally, this means that Europeans must
recuperate from any such injuries under a more bureaucratic system with
less zealous representation. 125
Second, successful European group actions will generally result in
119. See Sherman, supra note 76, at 418.
120. See Hodges, supra note 113, at 331 (explaining the partie civile system).
121. See Erik E. Larsen, France Moves Toward Allowing Class Action Suits, COMPETITION.
LAw360.coM, July 12, 2006, http://competition.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=7462;
Bailey Somers, France Drops Class Action Bill, COMPETMON.LAw360.COM, Jan. 30, 2007, http:/!
competition.law360.com/securefViewArticle.aspx?Id= 17511 (noting that until the French
National Assembly debated a class action bill in the fall of 2007, "[a] group of Parisian lawyers
was already offering collective legal actions through a Web site called classaction.fr, which works
around restrictions in French law by allowing clients to sign up for [class action] suit[s] on the
Web").
122. Alexia Garamfalvi, U.S. Firms Prepare for European Class Actions, LAW.COM, June 25,
2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1182416759806. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP has already "put together a group of its class action and litigation specialists to
carefully follow the development of class actions throughout Europe." Id.
123. See Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law, 11 Duim J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 355, 357-58 (2001) ("[T]here is no method of self-appointment of an individual
champion ....").
124. See id. at 358 (noting that there is "no concept of an individual private Attorney
General"); see also Hodges, supra note 113, at 339 (explaining that social security systems rather
than tort law "are the principal mechanisms of providing security and finance for injured citizens
in Europe").
125. See Koch, supra note 123, at 358 (arguing that the resulting European system involves
"poorly-motivated, cumbersome, and perhaps understaffed bureaucracy," as well as questionable
legal representation).
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an award of injunctive relief rather than in damages. 126 If damages are
awarded, they will generally be lower than in the United States, and they
will not include punitive damages. 2 7 From a policy standpoint, poten-
tial European tortfeasors are more heavily regulated than their U.S.
counterparts and thus do not require a system of punitive damages to
deter them from wrongdoing. 12 8
Third, European attorneys are usually reimbursed for their services
by public funding or in accordance with the "loser pays" principle.' 29
Bearing the risk of incurring multiple legal fees under this principle,
European plaintiffs are discouraged from bringing weak or speculative
claims against corporate defendants in hopes of receiving a speedy set-
tlement. 130  Because of this payment principle, because European law-
yers are restricted from advertising as freely as U.S. lawyers, 13' and
because most European courts function in a predictable and scientific
manner, 32 European lawyers have little incentive to devote much of
their practice to group litigation.
In sum, although most Europeans continue to reject the class-action
system as it exists in the United States, some people in the European
legal community are interested in adapting the class-action system to fit
their own legal framework. 133
D. Multiparty Arbitration Abroad
Given the new and developing nature of class litigation abroad, it is
no surprise that multiparty arbitration is little known outside of the
126. See id. (explaining that European-style collective actions emphasize injunctive relief
rather than damages).
127. Hodges, supra note 113, at 330 ("No European jurisdiction generally permits punitive
damages .....
128. See id.
129. See Koch, supra note 123, at 365 (describing the cost rules for most European countries,
which include public funding and financing "via the market"). According to the "loser pays"
principle, the losing party to a dispute pays not only their own attorney's fees but also the
opposing party's attorney's fees. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIvnL PROCEDURE 288 (6th ed. 2004).
130. See Hodges, supra note 113, at 329-44 (arguing that the lack of a "loser pays" principle
which would aim "to discourage weak cases" in the U.S. has created a "grossly over-heated
litigation market" here).
131. See id. at 329 (noting that lawyers are prohibited from advertising in most European
jurisdictions outside of England).
132. This predictable and scientific manner stands in contrast to U.S. jury verdicts, which can
be heavily swayed by emotion. See id. at 330 ("The U.S. jury system introduces a level of
instability by lowering the level of intellectual and scientific understanding of which the court is
capable.").
133. See If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them, supra note 114 ("[A London-based lawyer]
believes that businesses might cheer the arrival of class actions in Europe if they understood how
they differ from the American sort.").
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United States.' 34 Class arbitrations are particularly rare and unknown in
civil-law countries. 3 5 Indeed, many commentators agree that interna-
tional arbitral tribunals are an inappropriate venue to resolve class dis-
putes because many parties agree only to arbitrate outside of their home
country when they are certain that the entire arbitral process will be
based on the common will and agreement of the parties. 13 6 Thus, the
more parties there are to a contract or to a dispute, the more care the
arbitral tribunal will generally take to ensure that all of the parties have
agreed to resolve the dispute by arbitration.
137
In addition, related disputes that are being heard before an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal generally cannot be consolidated because of cer-
tain "practical and legal problems.' 38  For example, the different
disputes to be consolidated usually stem from different arbitration agree-
ments that usually contain differing provisions concerning arbitrator-
appointment methods, rules of arbitration, and conflicting laws gov-
erning the merits of the dispute. 139
There are, however, examples of courts ordering a consolidation of
claims before an international arbitral tribunal. Among the countries
that have enacted reforms such as the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
of 2000 ("RUAA") t4° are the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Hong
134. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, T 3-82, at 205-06 (noting that it is difficult and
sometimes impossible to achieve joinder and consolidation in arbitral proceedings).
135. See Hanotiau, supra note 95, at 39-40 ("[Group actions] are still relatively rare and
unknown in civil law countries.").
136. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-73, at 200 ("[T]he arbitral process is based
upon agreement of the parties ...."); see also Dunham, supra note 11, at 329 (noting that under
ICC rules, a third party may only intervene in arbitral proceedings if all parties agree to it). It is
presumably very difficult to imagine that all members of a nebulous class of claimants could come
to an agreement that they all wish to arbitrate.
137. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-73, at 200 ("The greater the number of such
persons, the greater the degree of care which should be taken to ensure that none of them is joined
in the proceeding against its will.") (quoting Jean-Louis Delvolvd, Final Report on Multi-party
Arbitrations, 6 ICC BULL. 1, 26 (1995)).
138. Id. at 206. Consolidation, of course, differs from class arbitration in that consolidation
concerns claims that have already been filed and may be arbitrated separately. On the other hand,
class arbitration concerns small claims that may never be heard other than through the vehicle of a
class proceeding. See Stemlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 7, at 86
(explaining the difference in consequences between a court's order to refuse consolidation and a
court's order to refuse class arbitration).
139. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-82, at 206.
140. The RUAA empowers courts to order consolidations of arbitral claims. As of late 2006,
this act was adopted in 11 states and it is under consideration in many other states. See Michael
H. Diamant, Philip R. Bautista & Kahn Kleinman, Strategies for Mediation, Arbitration, and
Other Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: LITIGATING
TRADEMARK, DOMAIN NAME & UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES 237, 248 (2006) (noting that the
RUAA has been adopted in Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and Washington).
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Kong."'4 Likewise, the London Court of International Arbitration Rules
("LCIA Rules") permit joinder or intervention of third parties without
the consent of the existing parties if it would be just, expeditious, and
economical to provide a single forum.' 4 2 Disputes concerning commod-
ities and maritime matters are regularly resolved using "string arbitra-
tions" whereby all parties in a product chain are bound by the
arbitrator's decision. 143 This type of practice implies a quasi "industry-
wide permission" to settle all matters through arbitration despite blurring
the traditional boundaries set by the nature of party consent. In addition,
even though the text of the New York Convention implies that an arbi-
tral award granted after consolidation of claims might not be enforcea-
ble, 144 there is broad support for the theory that the award would be
enforceable by any party to the arbitration. 145
Because many transnational business deals concern multilayered
contractual obligations,'46 arbitral tribunals often confront the question
of consolidating related but distinct claims that stem from these multi-
layered obligations. Consider the following hypothetical example of an
international construction project.'47 An investor from country A enters
into a contract, including an arbitration provision, with a main contractor
from country B who subsequently enters into numerous additional con-
tracts containing separate arbitration provisions with subcontractors. If
any of the work performed on the project is inadequate, the investor
would be able to join all of the parties together to resolve the dispute in
most national courts. 148 However, because the arbitration provisions
involved in the contracts governing the project are separate, the investor
141. See Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 298 (outlining legislation in the
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Hong Kong).
142. London Court of International Arbitration Rules, arts. 8.1, 8.2 (1998), available at http://
www.lcia.org/ARBfolder/arbmain.htm.
143. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-80, at 204 (noting that string arbitrations
have been created because it would be "wasteful for the dispute to be litigated or arbitrated at each
stage").
144. New York Convention, supra note 12, at 6, art. V(1)(d) ("[The recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if] the composition of the arbitral authority or the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.").
145. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-82, at 206 (arguing that where an arbitral
tribunal issues an award after being "imposed upon the parties," there is "strong support" for the
view that the award would be enforceable under the New York Convention).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
147. This hypothetical is an adapted version of the hypothetical in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 27, 1-48, at 29-30.
148. For example, if the investor brought such a claim in U.S. federal court, the defendants
could be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), which provides in pertinent part:
"All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
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may arbitrate only against the main contractor, after which the main con-
tractor may seek to recover against the subcontractors in separate
arbitrations.
Of course, even though these claims could be consolidated with the
consent of all of the parties involved, this rarely happens because con-
solidation does not appear to be in any party's interest. The investor
would not want to lengthen and complicate proceedings. 49 The subcon-
tractors would also prefer to await the outcome of the main arbitration to
see if there is even a case for them to answer. 150 But given that arbitra-
tion contains no comparable notion to stare decisis,15" ' the subcontractors
in this case would not necessarily have a better understanding of the
strength or weaknesses of their case by knowing the outcome of the
main arbitration because their follow-up arbitrations could very well
result in inconsistent findings on the very same questions of law.1 52
Thus, the subcontractors would be confronted with the choice of
whether they should (1) await the results of the arbitration between the
main contractor and the investor, with the risk of an inconsistent deci-
sion 153 in a potential future arbitration against the main contractor, or (2)
agree to consolidate the main contractor's claims against them with the
investor's claim against the main contractor, thereby risking the cost and
the time of arbitrating a dispute that they would have been able to avoid
if the main contractor prevailed in the initial arbitration.
Although party consent is the cornerstone of international arbitra-
tion, l5 4 courts are not without a voice on such matters. For example, in
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp., a British
149. The investor would be even less inclined to consolidate proceedings if the European
"loser pays" principle applied to the proceedings, because the investor would then risk having to
pay a larger amount in the event of an adverse ruling from the arbitral panel.
150. If the main contractor prevailed in the initial arbitration against the investor, the main
contractor would presumably not seek to collect from the subcontractors and suppliers.
151. Stare decisis is defined as "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 53, at 1414. As applied to arbitration, an arbitral tribunal is not
ultimately bound by it previous rulings in the same manner as a court, although the tribunal may
consider its previous rulings persuasive authority. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Local 420,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 718 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing in the context of labor
arbitration that "[p]rinciples of stare decisis and res judicata do not have the same doctrinal force
in arbitration proceedings as they do in judicial proceedings").
152. For example, there could be inconsistent findings on the issue of causation.
153. For example, in the first arbitration between the main contractor and the investor, an
arbitral panel could rule that the main contractor caused all damages to the investor, but in a
second arbitration between the main contractor and the subcontractors, a different arbitral panel
could rule that the subcontractors were responsible for all damages.
154. See REDEaRN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 1-08, at 6 ("An agreement by the parties to
submit to arbitration any disputes or differences between them is the foundation stone of modem
international commercial arbitration.").
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court that was confronted with a similar factual scenario compensated
for the fact that it could not order consolidation of the various arbitra-
tions by insisting that the same arbitrator decide each of the separate
arbitration proceedings.' 55 Thus, applying this ruling to the facts of the
hypothetical, the subcontractors would probably still decide to await the
result of the first arbitration, hoping that the main contractor would pre-
vail and not seek to recover from them. The subcontractors, however,
would also know that if the main contractor lost and sought to recover
from them, the result of subsequent arbitral proceedings would likely be
consistent with the result of the main proceeding.
V. "THE PERFECT STORM"
The concept of arbitration has evolved from its core as a simple,
two-party dispute-resolution mechanism based on contractual consent
into a complex system that may involve multiple parties, including both
nonsignatories and groups of claimants who wish to resolve their dis-
putes through class arbitration or consolidated arbitration. 56 If these
two trends-toward nonsignatory arbitration and class arbitration-con-
tinue, it is increasingly likely that they will also overlap.
Consider the following scenario. A group of claimants decides to
begin a class arbitration before an international tribunal against a single
defendant stemming from separate contracts that each of the claimants
had with the defendant. To increase their chances of obtaining a poten-
tially large recovery, the claimants try to form a large class, including
people who have suffered similar injuries at the hands of the defendant
but who have never signed an arbitration agreement with the defendant.
The resulting dispute involves a class arbitration with nonsignatory class
members. Such disputes are conceivable under several nonsignatory
theories, including succession, estoppel, and assumption.
Under the theory of succession, an assignee or successor in interest
of a contract containing an arbitration provision may have the duty to
arbitrate any disputes that arise from that agreement despite never hav-
ing signed the agreement.' 57 In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. v.
Pulte Home Corp., homeowners who brought suit against the builder of
their house were compelled to arbitrate their claim.'58 This was so
because the previous owners of the home had signed an agreement with
the builder containing an arbitration clause that provided that warranties
given to the original purchasers were also provided to "all subsequent
155. (1982) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425, 427.
156. See discussion supra Part IlI-IV.
157. See discussion supra Part III.A.6.
158. No. 8:04-CV-2357-T-EAJ, 2005 WL 1345779, at *7 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2005).
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owners."' 5 9 This situation could be replicated in the case of any com-
pany that produces or manufactures a product with a similar warranty,
which is then sold to buyers in various countries. A group of buyers,
including second-hand and third-hand owners who have been injured by
the product,160 could potentially bring a class arbitration against the
company as absent nonsignatory class members.
Under the theory of estoppel, a party who signed an arbitration
agreement may be estopped from avoiding arbitration with an opposing
party who never signed the same arbitration agreement if "the issues the
nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the
agreement that the estopped party has signed."' 161 In JLM Industries,
Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 162 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit compelled arbitration of antitrust claims by a group of maritime
charterers that purported to represent an estimated class of 500 to 700
charterers 1 63 because each of the charterer claimants had signed an arbi-
tration agreement with subsidiaries of the defendant parcel-tanker own-
ers. 164 In addition, the Second Circuit held that the signatory charterers
were estopped from avoiding arbitration against the nonsignatory parcel-
tanker owners where the charterer's claims against the nonsignatory
owners stemmed from alleged joint and several liability arising from the
signatory owners' contracts. 165
In a related litigation by other putative class representatives follow-
ing the JLM decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that an arbitral panel's decision to permit a class arbitra-
tion between a nonsignatory defendant and a class of signatory claimants
had been made in manifest disregard of the law. 166 The court held that
arbitration clauses that are silent on the issue of class arbitration cannot
be construed to permit such class proceedings under federal maritime
law or under New York state contract law. 167 Nevertheless, in JLM the
Second Circuit suggested that it could permit piecemeal arbitration
involving a class of nonsignatories in the future, when it stated that just
159. Id. at *2.
160. Products are regularly resold from one consumer to another consumer in informal
marketplaces such as www.ebay.com.
161. Choctaw Generation Ltd. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64
F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995)).
162. 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004).
163. Id. at 180-81.
164. Id. at 177-78.
165. Id. at 178 n.7.
166. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
167. Id. at 384-86.
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because an underlying lawsuit takes the form of a class action, that does
not bar the matter from arbitration, because "[f]ederal courts have...
consistently enforced arbitration provisions in the context of class action
lawsuits when federal statutory claims have been at issue." '168 Thus,
future nonsignatory defendants who have been sued for antitrust viola-
tions by a group of customers could conceivably compel arbitration or
be compelled to arbitrate the resulting dispute against the class of
customers.
Under the theory of assumption, an arbitration clause may apply to
a nonsignatory where the nonsignatory has impliedly agreed to arbi-
trate. 169 Consider the following hypothetical example under this theory.
Suppose that at the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing
in 2008, a piece of the newly constructed stadium collapses, and injures
or kills hundreds of attendees from all over the world. Suppose further
that the admission tickets the attendees used to enter the stadium con-
tained a clause stating that any dispute arising from the ceremony and
brought against the Olympic Committee must be resolved by arbitration.
Finally, suppose that this arbitration clause contained no provision bar-
ring the possibility of class arbitration. Under these facts, each of the
attendees who obtained their admission ticket without physically signing
the agreement would be considered a nonsignatory to the agreement and
may be adjudged to have consented to arbitrate any potential disputes
stemming from the use of the ticket and attendance at the opening cere-
mony. If a group of representative-injured attendees brought arbitral
action against the Olympic Committee on behalf of the entire group of
injured attendees, the nonrepresentative attendees would presumably
have to accept the arbitral award or decision unless they opted out of the
proceedings. 170
These hypothetical scenarios raise critical legal and policy ques-
tions, which will be addressed below under the following issue head-
ings: (A) Constitutionality, (B) Consent, (C) Confidentiality, and (D)
Efficiency. Each heading will first address common arguments made
for prohibiting the use of arbitral tribunals to resolve such hypothetical
disputes in order to maintain the traditional, contractual basis of arbitra-
168. JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 180 n.9 (quoting Lewis Tree Serv., Inc. v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because no
class had been certified and only the claims of JLM were before the court, the Second Circuit
specifically refused to decide whether the arbitrations would be in class form or piecemeal form.
Id.
169. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
170. To keep this illustration simple, this hypothetical considers one defendant only, the
Olympic Committee. In reality, there would probably be many other potential defendants
responsible for designing and building the stadium, including contractors, subcontractors,
architects, and engineers.
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tion. Each heading will then recognize the strongest arguments high-
lighting the possible advantages of using arbitration to resolve such
disputes.
A. Constitutionality
Class arbitrations raise a variety of constitutional concerns.' 71
Absent class members to a federal class action being litigated in an Arti-
cle III court are constitutionally protected by a government-appointed
judge who is required to follow specific procedural rules ensuring con-
stitutional protection. 17 2 In contrast, absent members to class arbitration
find themselves in a vulnerable position where the same constitutional
rights, protected in a court of law, could be neglected. There are two
reasons for this disparity.
First, an arbitrator, unlike a judge, is not a servant of the state and
does not have state-sanctioned authority to imprison people or impose
penalties in the form of payments to the state.' 73 An arbitral tribunal's
jurisdiction is not the same as a judge's jurisdiction.' 74 Arbitrators
require judicial support in some aspects of their proceedings under the
FAA'75 because arbitrators are "not considered [ ] state actor[s] within
the meaning of constitutional jurisprudence."' 76  Thus, whereas a
judge's jurisdiction, powers, and duties are "clearly established" by stat-
utory and constitutional law, an arbitrator's jurisdiction, powers, and
duties derive from a "complex mixture" of the law as well as the wills of
the parties to a dispute as expressed by contract.' 77 Also, less uniformity
exists between arbitrators on international tribunals who come from dif-
ferent countries and legal backgrounds than between a panel of appellate
judges all trained in the same law from the same country. 178 These fun-
171. This subsection will primarily focus on class arbitrations; the contractual concerns
involved in nonsignatory arbitrations are deferred to subsections B, C, and D.
172. See discussion supra Part IVA.
173. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 8-11, at 423 (noting that the powers to
imprison and to impose penalties in the form of fines are reserved to judges appointed by the
state).
174. See id. ("[T]he powers of an arbitral tribunal are not necessarily the same as those of a
court."). Usually an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction is more limited than a judge's jurisdiction, but
the tribunal's jurisdiction may be wider than a judge's in some respects if so provided by the
controlling arbitration agreement. For example, a British court applying U.S. law would have no
power to order triple damages, but an arbitral tribunal sitting in England may have this power
under the disputed arbitration agreement. Id.
175. For example, the FAA authorizes courts to stay litigation pending arbitration, enforce
arbitration agreements, appoint arbitrators, and confirm arbitration awards. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-5, 10
(2000).
176. Weston, supra note 80, at 1717.
177. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 5-01, at 277.
178. See id., 8-25, at 434 (noting that arbitrators who decide major commercial disputes
usually do not have a "shared legal background").
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damental differences between courts of law and arbitral panels could
lead to an unpredictable and perhaps volatile system of justice for vul-
nerable class members in arbitration.
Second, arbitral proceedings are private actions unaffected by the
procedural due process regulations provided by Rule 23.179 Thus, if
class arbitration is instituted based on an arbitration agreement that does
not specify procedural rules to govern the proceedings, there are no uni-
versal requirements as there would be in a court proceeding under Rule
23.180 Even if there were rules governing the procedure, it is difficult to
imagine an effective method of requiring notice to class members who
could be scattered across the globe.' 8 '
In addition to not receiving traditional court-imposed protections,
absent class members to an arbitration might also miss some of the bene-
fits normally bestowed on parties to a regular arbitral dispute. For
example, parties to an international arbitration generally have the right
to participate in the process of nominating or selecting an arbitrator. 82
In class arbitration, however, absent class members would probably
have no say in the selection of an arbitrator. 83 Thus, absent class mem-
bers would be deprived of an inherent characteristic of arbitration that
usually instills confidence in the parties. 184 Absent class members to an
international arbitration appear even more vulnerable when one consid-
ers that arbitral awards, unlike judicial decisions, traditionally did not
come in the form of a written opinion, which can be inspected on
appeal.1 85 Arbitral awards are generally expected to be honored-even
179. See Weston, supra note 80, at 1717 ("[A]rbitration typically need not afford parties the
due process otherwise guaranteed in a court of law.").
180. In such a class arbitration, there would be no requirement to provide absent class
members with notice or the option to opt-out. There would be no set class certification method
regarding numerosity, commonality and representativeness and no expectation that an arbitrator
would be responsible for determining the adequacy of representation and the fairness of
settlements. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
181. Perhaps constitutional issues could be avoided if notice were given on an "opt-in basis"
rather than on an "opt-out basis."
182. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 4-12, at 216-17 (outlining the arbitrator
selection process).
183. See Weston, supra note 80, at 1773 (explaining that only the named plaintiffs and the
defendants select an arbitrator with their attorneys in a class arbitration proceeding). It may be
appropriate that counsel for the class selects an arbitrator because counsel is usually more
informed about the arbitrators than the class members are.
184. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, T 4-12, at 216-17 (describing how parties should
be free to choose their own arbitrators).
185. See Weston, supra note 80, at 1777 ("[A]rbitrators do not typically provide written
opinions that explain their decisions .... ). This tradition is changing particularly among ICSID
and NAFTA arbitral tribunals, which regularly publish written decisions. See infra note 220 and
accompanying text. Parties to complex proceedings may also be more likely to demand a written
decision from their arbitral tribunal.
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if they are considered incorrect. 186 For these reasons, some commenta-
tors suggest that constitutional concerns "pose a major hurdle for arbitral
class actions."' 1
87
Despite these constitutional concerns, there are a number of respon-
sive arguments in favor of class arbitrations. Although an arbitral tribu-
nal differs fundamentally from a courtroom, this does not mean that an
arbitral tribunal is incapable of protecting the due process rights of the
parties in class arbitration. An arbitration agreement signifies consent to
resolve a dispute in an alternative forum, but it does not necessarily sig-
nify "consent to forgo due process rights."' 8 8 It is not beyond an arbitra-
tor's capability to oversee a complex case and still protect the due
process rights of the parties involved. 89 An arbitrator may work along-
side a judge or under the limited supervision of a judge to ensure that the
arbitrator is accurately protecting the due process rights of all parties
concerned. 190
Both the New York Convention and the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, Model Law on International Arbitra-
tion ("UNCITRAL Model Law") 191 place special emphasis on the
principle of equality in party treatment.'92 In fact, the New York Con-
vention places more rigorous standards on due process compliance for
international arbitral awards than the FAA places on due process com-
pliance for domestic arbitral awards.1 93
186. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 9-06, at 482 (explaining that parties should be
prepared to accept the decision of an international arbitral tribunal even if they consider it wrong,
so long as the correct procedures are observed). Most judicial systems still may extend some form
of judicial review to assure arbitral fairness; however, parties are expected to consider the arbitral
tribunal's ruling final so that arbitration does not become another form of litigation where
unfavorable decisions can simply be appealed. Id.
187. Stemlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 7, at 52.
188. Weston, supra note 80, at 1722-23.
189. See Hanotiau, supra note 95, at 54 (arguing that experienced arbitrators can handle
complex cases in compliance with due process requirements).
190. See Daniel R. Waltcher, Note, Classwide Arbitration and 10b-5 Claims in the Wake of
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 403-05 (1989)
(describing how an arbitrator could handle a class arbitration with the assistance of a court); see
also Stemlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 7, at 118 (noting that this type of
"back and forth" between judge and arbitrator has been criticized as diminishing the efficient
aspects of arbitration).
191. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, June 21, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
192. See id., art. 18 ("[Plarties shall be treated equally and each party shall be given a full
opportunity of presenting his case."); see also New York Convention, supra note 12, art. V(1)(b)
(providing that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if "[t]he party
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case").
193. Under the New York Convention, a court may vacate an international arbitral award
because the arbitrator did not comport with due process. See New York Convention, supra note
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Although the due process provisions implemented into the New
York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law are admittedly vague
in order to allow adaptability in different countries, 94 there is no reason
to believe that these provisions could not be expanded to provide more
complex and specific notice requirements in the event a class arbitration
involved a large class of geographically diverse class members. These
procedural requirements may be enforced by national courts. 195 Even if
courts have traditionally deferred to arbitral decisions regarding due pro-
cess issues in the past, 196 there is no reason to believe that courts could
not be required to analyze the due process aspects of arbitral decisions
more closely in the case of class arbitration.1 97 Courts have provided
"adequate judicial supervision" for domestic class arbitrations in the
past.' 98 There is no reason to believe that a national court could not
provide the same services for an international arbitral dispute.
To address any concerns regarding absent class members' ability to
select an arbitrator before class arbitration, the New York Convention or
the UNCITRAL Model Law could allow selection of an arbitrator
according to a vote where absent class members are counted equally
with representative claimants. A national court sitting in the country of
arbitration could also oversee the selection process. Under this method,
the will of the majority of the parties would still be respected, and those
class members who were unsatisfied with the arbitrator selection could
either opt out of the arbitration or remain, keeping in mind that class
members in judicial litigation are not allowed to select a judge.
Important negative consequences could also result from a court's
decision to prohibit class arbitration. For example, under the Interna-
tional Bar Association ("IBA") Ethics for International Arbitrators, arbi-
trators are not permitted to communicate with parties to an ongoing
arbitration. 99 In class arbitration or a consolidated arbitration, this
12, art. V(l)(b). In contrast, the FAA does not list an arbitrator's failure to comport with due
process as a specific ground for vacating a domestic arbitral award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (not
listing due process violations).
194. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 9-22, at 491 (noting that provisions are
deliberately left vague in order to suite the different needs of many countries).
195. See id., 10-40, at 533 (explaining that the appropriate function of a court is simply to
decide whether there has been a fair hearing).
196. See id., 9-21, at 491 (noting that there are numerous examples of unsuccessful due
process defenses before national courts).
197. One way to require courts to do this would be to expand or amend the New York
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.
198. See, e.g., Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Ct. App. 1986)
("This case appears to offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit the class action mold,
with adequate judicial supervision over the class aspects.").
199. INT'L BAR Ass'N, ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS R. 5.3 (1987) available at
http://www.ibanet.org/publications/Publicationshome.cfm (follow "Guides and free materials"
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would mean that the arbitrator would be prohibited from communicating
with any parties, including absent class members. However, if all inter-
ested parties were required to resolve their claims separately pursuant to
a court order, an arbitrator involved in any one of the related disputes
could become ripe for corruption by communicating with the parties to a
separate arbitration who were intimately familiar with the facts of their
case.
200
B. Consent
Because arbitration is based on a contractual agreement, each party
usually consents to use arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechanism
before the dispute arises.2"' Thus, extending arbitration agreements to
include nonsignatories may weaken or even destroy this important foun-
dation of the arbitral process.2 °2 Likewise, representative claimants in
class arbitration are not required to obtain consent of other class mem-
bers to begin arbitral proceedings. 2 3 These developments could further
erode party autonomy in international arbitration, which already looks "a
little frayed [a]round the edges. ' 2°
Because of the vast geographical distances and cultural differences
between potential claimants in a class arbitration or a consolidated arbi-
tration, it might be practically impossible to obtain consent from all
potential participants to such a dispute before proceedings begin.215 In
Siemens A.G. v. Dutco,2 °6 a French court expressed this exact concern.
In that case, one party brought arbitral proceedings against a consortium
of two German companies under ICC rules, and when the ICC requested
that the two German companies make a joint nomination for an arbitra-
tor rather than two independent nominations, the French court held that
hyperlink; then follow "IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators" hyperlink)
("Throughout the arbitral proceedings, an arbitrator should avoid any unilateral communications
regarding the case with any party, or its representatives.").
200. This is because the IBA Ethics for International Arbitrators does not prohibit
communications between arbitrators and non-parties. See id.
201. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-30, at 175 ("Party consent is a prerequisite
for arbitration.").
202. Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 290 (concluding that "an over-zealous
approach to 'extending' the arbitration agreement to non-signatories may undermine the
fundamental touchstone of arbitration-consent").
203. See Weston, supra note 80, at 1726 (explaining that representative plaintiffs are not
required to receive prior consent to initiate a class action lawsuit).
204. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 7-42, at 415 (quoting Lord Mustill, Address at
LCIA conference at St John's College: International Economic Disputes: A Wider Perspective
(April 1, 2004)).
205. See Lamm & Aqua, supra note 15, at 717-18 (arguing that obtaining consent in a class
arbitration would be "impossible").
206. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 7, 1992, J.D.I. 1992, 119, 707.
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this violated their principle of equality. z 7
Contracting parties choose to include arbitration provisions in their
agreements and are motivated to remain cordial to one another precisely
because they know that any potential disputes that arise will be resolved
according to their consensual wishes.2 8 Thus, if these parties believe
that the arbitral process is losing its consensual foundation, they may
begin to question the entire process or choose to resolve their disputes
using another method of dispute resolution.
Despite these arguments, consent has never been an absolute notion
in the context of international arbitration. For example, under the LCIA
Rules, consent of all of the parties to an arbitration is not required to join
a third party to the arbitration; rather, consent may be inferred.20 9 Con-
sent is also interpreted broadly by many national courts, which look to
honor and validate arbitration agreements.210 Some federal district
courts have even held that parties intended to arbitrate a dispute stem-
ming from an agreement that referred to an arbitral forum that did not
exist. 21 ' Thus, consent has always been a flexible concept in arbitration.
In the event of a class arbitration involving nonsignatory class
members who do not consent to arbitrate, there are two possible ways to
resolve the dispute without abandoning the concept of consent. First,
the nonsignatory class members could opt out of the class arbitration and
arbitrate their disputes in a separate proceeding to which they consent.
Second, the arbitral institutional rules could include a separate provision
for multiparty, complex proceedings under which the consent of the par-
ties would be determined not by unanimous vote, but rather by a major-
ity vote. Thus, the dispute would still be resolved in an efficient and
effective manner according to most, if not all, of the parties' wishes. In
207. Id. at 727-28.
208. See Kilby, supra note 91, at 419 (explaining that the goodwill between contracting parties
is preserved because the manner in which their disputes are resolved is "tailored to their wishes").
209. London Court of International Arbitration Rules, art. 22(h) (1998), available at http://
www.lcia.org/ARBfolder/arb-main.htm ("[An arbitral tribunal may order that any third person]
be joined in the arbitration as a party, provided any such third person and the applicant party have
consented thereto in writing .... "). This rule does not require that all parties to the arbitration
consent. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 1 3-85, at 208; see also Hosking, Quest for Consent,
supra note 19, at 297 ("[C]onsent to permit joinder may be inferred from consent to a particular
institution's rules.").
210. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-38, at 182 (noting that most national courts
give effect to arbitration agreements whenever possible).
211. See, e.g., Warnes, S.A. v. Harvic Int'l., Ltd., No. 92 Civ. 5515 (RWS), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8457, at *3, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1993) (holding that parties who contracted to arbitrate
before a non-existent "New York Commercial Arbitration Association" must arbitrate before the
AAA); Astra Footwear Indus. v. Harwyn Int'l, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 907, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(appointing an arbitrator to settle a dispute between parties that had agreed to arbitrate before the
New York Chamber of Commerce, which had ceased to arbitrate disputes).
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the event that a party voted against the arbitral proceeding and refused to
participate in the subsequent proceedings, the arbitral tribunal would still
be required to consider the merits of the nonparticipating parties' case in
its absence before making a determination.212
Thus, the arbitral process offers additional safety mechanisms in
order to protect the rights of nonconsenting parties.
C. Confidentiality
Arbitrations have generally been more secretive than litigation
because arbitral decisions have traditionally been unpublished 213 and
commercial arbitral proceedings usually occur in the private confines of
rented hotel rooms rather than in public courtrooms.214
On the one hand, many parties choose to arbitrate rather than to
litigate precisely because they do not want the subject matter of their
dispute to become public."1 5 Allowing large-scale, multiparty disputes
to be resolved by arbitration could turn a traditionally private affair into
a public spectacle. 2 6 Although international arbitral forums have tradi-
tionally been successful in avoiding the influence of local politics in the
outcome of a dispute, 17 this tradition could be threatened if the dispute
involved massive numbers of litigants permitted to arbitrate simultane-
ously in one location, triggering local media and other attention. In
addition, to the extent that parties to an arbitration clause agree to keep
the subject matter of their potential dispute confidential, this agreement
would not apply to nonsignatories who are later compelled to arbitrate
alongside the contracting parties. These concerns could cause parties to
abandon arbitration as a dispute-resolution device.
212. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 6-122, at 386, 8-46, at 446 (explaining that
arbitral tribunals, unlike courts, cannot issue default judgments, but must test the assertions made
by the present party before deciding a dispute).
213. See Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada
and Methanex Corporation v. United States, 21 ARB. INT'L. 211, 213 (2005) (noting that the
general rule is that an arbitral decision will not be published if one party objects).
214. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 4-99, at 262 ("[Hotels provide the] most
frequent solution to the problem of finding a suitable venue for an international commercial
arbitration .... "); see also The Secret Trade Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A26 (arguing
that the private nature of arbitral proceedings benefits large corporations).
215. See S.I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An
Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 933 (1998) ("[M]any parties choose to arbitrate their disputes rather than
litigate them precisely because they do not want certain information, such as trade secrets,
revenue, and other sensitive data, to become public.").
216. See generally Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings,
30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 121 (1995).
217. See Dunham, supra note 11, at 327 ("One of the key selling points of international
arbitration is the avoidance of the 'politics is local' problem.").
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On the other hand, a general overview of international arbitration
will confirm that confidentiality, like consent, is not an absolute notion.
Most North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") awards are
published, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") also routinely publishes entire decisions or, at least,
the names of parties to an arbitration.21 8 Even if the parties to an arbitra-
tion do not consent to have the result of their dispute published, arbitral
tribunals often publish awards by simply withdrawing the names of the
parties. 19 This formality of withdrawing party names would probably be
ineffective in the event of a large-scale multiparty arbitration, especially
if the proceeding attracted the attention of the media.22 ° Since the
1990s, the prevailing line of thought is that the benefits of publishing
arbitral awards outweigh the traditional need for confidentiality in inter-
national arbitration.221
The privacy of arbitral proceedings has also always been subject to
factors outside of the arbitration itself. Courts may appoint the same
arbitrator to two or more similar cases, thereby making all of the rele-
vant documents and transcripts from one proceeding available to the
next proceeding to ensure consistent results. 2  Courts also play an
important role in challenging or enforcing arbitral awards, and any deci-
sion that a court makes may become a matter of public record. 2 3 Pub-
licly held corporations that become involved in arbitral proceedings may
have to disclose information about any such disputes to its shareholders
and to the general public under securities regulations. 224 Finally, sover-
eign entities, which are often parties to international arbitrations, should
expect that their participation in arbitral disputes will become a matter of
public interest. 22 5  Thus, large-scale, multiparty arbitrations will not
218. See Mistelis, supra note 213, at 212 (outlining the award publication process); see also
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2007); NAFTA Claims, http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 30,
2007). Note that ICSID and NAFTA arbitral tribunals primarily hear disputes between private
investors and sovereign entities deriving from treaties. See ICSID, supra; NAFTA Claims, supra.
219. See Mistelis, supra note 213, at 216. ("In practice many awards are published without
consent of the parties and without reference to their names.") (footnote omitted).
220. See discussion supra Part V.B.
221. The clearest benefit to publishing arbitral awards is the establishment of a body of
persuasive precedent for future arbitrations. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 8-106, at
478 ("The prevailing trend appears to favor publication.").
222. See Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. v. E. Bechtel Corp., (1982) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425,
427; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 3-81, at 205 (explaining that a national court
or an arbitrator may direct that all documents from one arbitral proceeding should be made
available to the parties of another proceeding).
223. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 8-106, at 478.
224. Id.
225. See Mistelis, supra note 213, at 212 (describing how the participation of state entities in
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destroy the notion of confidentiality in arbitration because this notion is
flexible and not absolute.
Nor does the participation of nonsignatories in arbitral disputes
destroy confidentiality. Even though a nonsignatory who becomes
involved in arbitral proceedings was never a party to the original arbitra-
tion agreement, the arbitrators routinely ensure that such nonsignatories
honor any confidentiality clauses contained in the original agreement by
simply requiring the nonsignatories to sign a confidentiality order upon
entering the arbitration.226 In fact, this procedure would ensure a higher
level of confidentiality than the alternative of not making the non-
signatory a party to the dispute and risking that the nonsignatory would
publicly release information or knowledge about the dispute.
D. Efficiency
Arbitration has a reputation of being an efficient dispute-resolution
mechanism.227  Because arbitration is seen as a reliable alternative to
litigation, which diminishes court-docket backlogs, courts generally will
enforce arbitration agreements and confirm arbitration awards.228 But
by transforming itself into a forum for resolving class disputes and dis-
putes involving nonsignatories, the institution of arbitration may lose
this traditional hallmark of efficiency.
Resolving class actions in an arbitral setting would probably force
arbitration to mimic the lengthy litigation class-action process in order
to adhere to due process requirements. 229  Thus, arbitration would no
longer differ from litigation, and it would no longer offer this advantage
over litigation in a national court.230 If an arbitral tribunal had to rely on
a court to adjudicate and to confirm certain aspects of such a dispute,231
this could result in a tedious "back and forth" between the tribunal and
the court. Class arbitrations also raise practical concerns that could
international disputes can "shift the emphasis from privacy and confidentiality to knowledge and
accountability").
226. See Strong, supra note 215, at 994.
227. See Kristin M. Blankley, Be More Specific! Can Writing a Detailed Arbitration
Agreement Expand Judicial Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV.
391, 408 (2006) (noting that the traditional benefits of arbitration include time and cost
efficiency).
228. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)
(discussing the Court's "strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of
international commercial disputes"); see also Sternlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra
note 7, at 22-23 (explaining how the U.S. Supreme Court has gone from being reluctant to
mandate arbitration to become "an extremely strong advocate of binding arbitration").
229. See sources cited supra notes 175-76.
230. See Stemlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, supra note 7, at 44-45 (noting that
attorneys who had participated in class arbitrations thought that they differed little from litigation).
231. See sources cited supra and text accompanying note 175-76.
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diminish the traditional efficiency benefit associated with arbitration.
For example, arbitrations involving parties from all over the globe
would inevitably be constrained by the time and expense of translation
and interpretation services necessary to ensure fairness to everyone
involved.232 Even if the parties to such a dispute decided to settle, the
party receiving settlement would probably want the terms of the settle-
ment to be in form of an award,23 3 and this would still require a long,
drawn-out arbitral process.
Class arbitrations involving absent nonsignatory class members
could become even more inefficient than regular class arbitrations
because any nonsignatories who are not satisfied with the arbitral deci-
sion would probably try to challenge the validity of the decision in court
on the basis of their nonsignatory status.2 34 In addition, arbitral tribunals
frequently reopen proceedings when evidence is offered by a party after
a hearing, because arbitral tribunals prefer to rule on a dispute only after
receiving all relevant evidence. 235 In the case of a large-scale, mul-
tiparty dispute, this would mean that arbitral proceedings would more
likely be reopened and delayed because new evidence could be offered
by any one of the many parties involved in the dispute.
On the other hand, class arbitration and nonsignatory arbitration
would not completely destroy the efficiency of the arbitral process.
Arbitration's reputation as a "time-saving device" is seen by some com-
mentators as a myth even without the influence of class arbitration or
nonsignatory arbitration.236 In addition, although the prospect of arbitrat-
ing many interrelated claims at once appears daunting and inefficient,
the only alternative would be a duplication of a similar disputes, result-
ing in potentially conflicting decisions after wasting a great deal of time
and money.2 37 The drawn-out procedures that may be necessary to
ensure the due process rights of all parties involved in a class arbitration
may seem tedious; however, they would serve to ensure the rights of the
parties and leave minimal grounds for appeal thereby saving time on any
potential appellate process. 238  Finally, bringing multiparty disputes
232. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, [ 3-54, at 190 (explaining how contracts drawn
up in different languages may force the occurrence of simultaneous translations during arbitral
proceedings despite the expensive and tedious nature of the translations).
233. See id., T 8-48, at 447 (discussing how parties receiving settlement offers usually want the
settlement in the form of an award, especially if the settlement involves any future performance).
234. See Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 300 (noting that a nonsignatory who
loses in arbitration may try to "re-litigate" the issue).
235. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 6-125, at 387.
236. See Dunham, supra note 11, at 345-46 ("International arbitration typically lasts over four
years and costs a substantial amount of money.").
237. See Hosking, Quest for Consent, supra note 19, at 297.
238. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 27, 10-07, at 513 (explaining that it is better to go
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before an arbitral tribunal rather than a court would save the parties the
time and expense of having to secure local counsel as would be required
in judicial litigation.239
VI. CONCLUSION
The nature of international arbitration is changing and must adapt
to fit the gaps left by imperfect national-court systems as well as the
evolving needs of the international community. One way to do this is to
continue to expand international arbitration to provide resolutions for
class disputes and disputes involving nonsignatories. Although the
immediate reaction of many arbitration practitioners is not to expand
arbitration beyond its traditional core, there are also important potential
benefits in using the arbitral process to resolve these new and untradi-
tional disputes.
through an arbitral process slowly so that little time will be spent on litigating the enforcement of
the resulting arbitral award).
239. Id., T 8-95, at 472 (arguing that a major attraction of international commercial arbitration
is that it is unnecessary to call upon local lawyers).
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